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FORM VS. FUNCTION IN RULE 10B-5
CLASS ACTIONS
AMANDA M. ROSE*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision last term in
1
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. did little to change the
fundamental landscape of securities fraud litigation in the United
2
States. Rule 10b-5 class actions premised on the “fraud-on-themarket” presumption of reliance may still be brought, although it is
now clear that defendants may present evidence of lack of price
distortion to rebut that presumption at the class certification stage.
Halliburton does, however, raise a variety of new questions that will
keep plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel fighting for years to
come. Determining the answers to these questions will be expensive,
but ultimately of little social value. This contribution to the Duke
Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy’s symposium “Fraud
on the Market after Halliburton II” explains why.
The problem stems from a mismatch between the form and
function of Rule 10b-5 class actions, a mismatch created by the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Basic v. Levinson, which first
3
recognized the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. Part I
describes how this doctrinal innovation served to untether the Rule
10b-5 private right of action from its moorings in the common law of
fraud, with the effect that Rule 10b-5 class actions today achieve none
of the social benefits that flow from the common law fraud cause of
action. Part II posits that Rule 10b-5 class actions might nevertheless
serve a desirable social function, to the extent they produce new
information about managerial misbehavior that is valuable to
shareholders and regulators, and the value of that information
Copyright © 2015 Amanda M. Rose.
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1. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
3. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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exceeds the costs of its production. Part III explains that the questions
raised by Halliburton, as well some of the most common issues that
litigants fight over in Rule 10b-5 class actions, serve merely to
increase litigation costs without producing any offsetting
informational benefits. Part IV concludes by suggesting that Rule 10b5 class actions be replaced with an alternative—and likely more
efficient—information-production mechanism, namely the SEC’s new
Whistleblower Bounty Program.
I. THE BREAK WITH THE COMMON LAW
Consider a simple fact pattern for a common law fraud action, one
involving the sale of securities: Promoter A induces Couple B to
invest in a company he owns by misrepresenting material facts about
the company. The common law fraud cause of action would allow
Couple B to sue Promoter A to recover any out-of-pocket losses
sustained that are causally related to the fraud, assuming the couple
could prove that they actually relied on the promoter’s misstatements
4
when they entered into the transaction.
The fact that this cause of action is available to fraud victims like
Couple B does important work to promote voluntary exchange in a
market economy. First, the threat of having to pay damages in such a
suit encourages would-be fraudsters to internalize the costs (or at
least some of the costs) of their contemplated fraud, making it less
profitable on an expected-value basis and therefore less likely to be
committed. Second, by promising relief ex post, the common law
fraud cause of action discourages potential victims from spending
inefficiently on precautions ex ante, including by foregoing wealthcreating transactions altogether. Finally, by requiring culpable
defendants to compensate injured plaintiffs, the common law fraud
cause of action also provides a mechanism for righting wrongs.
Rule 10b-5 renders it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made . . . not misleading . . . in connection with
5
the purchase or sale of securities,” but it does not explicitly lay out
the elements a plaintiff must establish to recover in a private suit. This
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently
makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another
to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for
pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1951).
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is because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), when it
promulgated the rule, never anticipated that the federal courts would
6
recognize a private right to sue under it. To give shape to the
judicially-recognized Rule 10b-5 private right of action, federal courts
initially looked to the common law fraud cause of action for guidance,
interpreting the elements of the implied right so as to track those of
the storied tort—presumably with the hope and expectation that it
7
would produce similar social benefits. In some simple cases of
securities fraud, like the one described above, the analogy between
common law fraud and Rule 10b-5 does in fact work well. In such
cases, the only real difference between a common law fraud and a
8
Rule 10b-5 cause of action is the latter’s broader jurisdictional reach.
In so-called fraud-on-the-market scenarios, however, the analogy
fails.
Whereas classic common law fraud cases involve privity of dealing
and actual reliance by the plaintiff on the misstatements of the
defendant, the typical fraud-on-the-market scenario involves agents
of a publicly traded corporation releasing falsely positive information
about their firm, either in SEC filings or in other public statements.
That misleading information, in turn, influences the trading activity of
a set of investors who actually read and rely on it (and who thus may
be able to state a common law fraud claim). The trading activity of
these “informed traders” then operates to inflate the price at which
millions of passive investors, who neither read nor rely on the
misstatements, buy shares in the company on the secondary market.
When the truth is revealed, the stock held by these passive investors
will decrease in value, but they will be unable to bring a common law
fraud claim due to their lack of actual reliance on the misstatements.

6. See Milton Freeman, Remarks at Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws (Nov. 18, 1966), in Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922
(1967) (stating that, as originally created, Rule 10b-5 “had no relation in the Commission’s
contemplation to private proceedings”).
7. See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[M]any of the
principles applicable to common law suits apply by analogy to [a Rule 10b-5 suit].”). The
elements of a private Rule 10b-5 claim are “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008) (citing Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005)).
8. Indeed, in Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the seminal
case that first recognized a private right to sue under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs could have
proceeded under either the common law or Rule 10b-5; Rule 10b-5 was preferred because of the
1934 Act’s provision for nationwide service of process. Id. at 514.
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When first presented with private Rule 10b-5 claims based on this
type of fact pattern, federal courts could have responded in a variety
of ways. For example, they might have stuck by their commitment to
the common law fraud analogy, holding that passive investors can
find no relief under Rule 10b-5 for fraud on the market due to their
lack of actual reliance. Alternatively, the courts might have
recognized that these sorts of cases are fundamentally different from
common law fraud cases and, in light of that, crafted a new and
coherent set of elements for stating such claims. They did neither.
Instead, in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court choose to modify
the common law reliance requirement to facilitate fraud-on-themarket class actions, while keeping the other elements of the Rule
9
10b-5 “fraud tort” intact.
According to Basic, plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption of
reliance if they can show that: (1) the alleged misrepresentations were
publicly known, (2) they were material, (3) the stock traded in an
efficient market, and (4) the plaintiff traded the stock between the
time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was
10
revealed. Although presumptions are not foreign to the common law
generally, or to the common law of fraud specifically, Basic did more
than recognize a presumption. It transformed the very meaning of
reliance. Under Basic, plaintiffs are not presumed to have relied on
the misstatement, but rather on the integrity of the stock’s market
price, which is itself presumed to have been distorted by the fraud.
The reliance presumed by Basic is therefore “fundamentally
different” from the reliance that has traditionally been required in
11
common law fraud cases.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic might seem to the casual
observer to have been a rather minor tweak to the common law. But
9. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
10. Id. at 241–49. As the Basic court explained, the so-called “fraud-on-the market”
presumption of reliance
is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price
of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. . .
. The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on
misrepresentations.
Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
11. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60
BUS. LAW. 507, 507–08 (2005).
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in fact it had major ramifications. Most notably, it created a form of
Rule 10b-5 litigation that shares none of the social virtues of common
law fraud, raising the question of its purpose.
Consider first the threat of damages. Unlike in a common law
fraud case, the threat of paying damages in a Rule 10b-5 class action
does not force would-be fraudsters to internalize the costs of their
contemplated fraud, thereby assisting in deterrence. Why? The simple
answer is that the individuals actually responsible for the fraud are
essentially never forced to pay in these suits; instead, the corporation
itself or its insurer—and, indirectly, the corporation’s innocent
12
shareholders—foot the bill.
The harder question is why individuals are never forced to pay.
The answer to that question takes us back to the Basic decision. By
recognizing a new type of reliance that investors who admittedly did
not read or rely on the alleged misstatements can establish based on
common proof, Basic dramatically increased the number of plaintiffs
who can sue to recover out-of-pocket damages under Rule 10b-5. At
the same time, it facilitated the aggregation of these plaintiffs’ claims
13
through the class action device. Basic thus had the effect of radically
14
increasing the size of the potential damage awards in these suits.
Enormous potential damage awards, combined with the possibility of
legal error, makes it rational for even innocent defendants to settle
marginal cases. Against this backdrop, a corporate board’s decision to
settle a Rule 10b-5 class action while shielding its officers from
15
liability is both legal and plausibly defensible.

12. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class
Actions? An Update, 26 PROF. LIAB. UNDERWRITING SOC’Y J. 1, 1, 4 (2013) (empirical study of
securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010, finding that the insurer paid the full
settlement in 58% of settled cases and partially funded the settlement in another 28%; outside
directors contributed in none of the settled cases, and officers contributed in only 2%).
13. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013)
(“Absent the fraud-on-the-market theory [adopted in Basic], the requirement that Rule 10b-5
plaintiffs establish reliance would ordinarily preclude certification of a class action seeking
money damages because individual reliance issues would overwhelm questions common to the
class.”).
14. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1999) (noting that damages in
Rule 10b-5 class actions can amount to a substantial percentage of a corporation’s total
capitalization).
15. Agency costs may explain a board’s decision to shield individual defendants from
liability, but so too may a genuine belief in the individuals’ innocence, or a fear that demanding
payment might lead to over-deterrence in the future, as honest managers take steps to avoid the
specter of liability.
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One might respond that the threat of damages in Rule 10b-5 class
actions still has some deterrent benefit insofar as corporations are
forced to pay settlements, because at least this ensures that
corporations will internalize some of the costs of fraud and perhaps
respond by taking steps to reduce its likelihood by better monitoring
corporate agents. The reality, however, is that when a solvent
corporation pays, its shareholders pay, and shareholders already have
good incentives to do what they can to prevent securities fraud,
16
because they are its primary victims. Moreover, in addition to paying
the settlements in Rule 10b-5 class actions, shareholders also recover
as members of the plaintiff class, so over time, diversified
shareholders will be on the receiving end of fraud-on-the-market class
actions roughly as often as they are on the paying end. As a result,
fraud-on-the-market settlement payments will be unlikely to affect
the behavior of diversified investors in any case.
Just as the empty threat of paying damages in a Rule 10b-5 class
action does not cause would-be fraudsters to internalize the costs of
securities fraud, the promise of receiving a damage award in a Rule
10b-5 class action does not discourage would-be victims from
investing in precautions. Again, because diversified investors stand on
both sides of the “v” in Rule 10b-5 class actions (as owners of the
corporations that pay the settlements as well as members of the
plaintiff class), settlement payments are, in the grand scheme, a wash
17
to them and thus unlikely to affect their behavior.
Finally, and for the same reasons, Rule 10b-5 class actions can
hardly be said to “right wrongs” in the way that common law fraud
suits do. Instead, non-culpable parties compensate, essentially,
themselves, for wrongs done by third parties who escape any direct
punishment in the litigation.

16. See Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting; How the SEC’s New Whistleblower
Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1252–1255
(2014) (explaining the traditional deterrence justification for corporate liability and why it fails
in the context of Rule 10b-5 class actions).
17. Moreover, as Frank Easterbook and Daniel Fischel observed long ago, diversified
shareholders stand to profit from secondary market fraud nearly as often as they lose, so they
have little incentive to invest in precautions even in the absence of legal relief. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611
(1985). Cf. Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1679, 1688 n.29 (2011) (noting some challenges to this argument). For a discussion of why Rule
10b-5 class actions cannot be defended as a mechanism for compensating non-diversified
information traders, see Rose, supra note 16 at 1244 n.38, and references cited therein.
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II. A MODERN RATIONALE FOR FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET SUITS
Just because fraud-on-the-market class actions do not produce the
same social benefits as common law fraud suits does not necessarily
mean that they are worthless. As I have argued elsewhere, fraud-onthe-market class actions might nevertheless be defended because they
have the capacity to produce information that is valuable to
18
shareholders and regulators.
This argument begins with the recognition that, although
diversified shareholders have natural incentives to cause firms in their
portfolio to take reasonable steps to deter fraud-on-the-market, it is
ultimately the board of directors that controls a corporation’s
operations, and the board is differently positioned:
Whereas diversified shareholders are likely to lose as often as they
win from secondary market fraud, and thus do not stand to profit
from its distributional consequences, directors—and the officers to
whom they may feel beholden—are positioned differently. They
have considerable wealth tied up in the particular firms they serve,
including stock, expected salary, and reputational capital. If left
unpunished, fraud-on-the-market could help to enhance that
19
wealth.

A threat of sanction may therefore be necessary to prompt
directors to invest the level of firm resources in fraud deterrence that
shareholders would prefer. It may also be necessary “to overcome
behavioral biases that lead directors to underestimate the likelihood
20
that their CEO or other top officers would engage in fraud.”
Although shareholders have numerous weapons at their disposal for
21
sanctioning directors who fail to advance their interests, those
weapons cannot be deployed unless the infidelity is detected, and
passive shareholders are poorly positioned to monitor directors’
efforts at fraud deterrence.
Fraud-on-the-market class actions might be conceptualized as a
way for shareholders to outsource this monitoring function to the
class action bar. If, lured by the prospect of a large fee award,
plaintiffs’ attorneys ferret out and publicize frauds that would

18. See generally, Rose & Squire, supra note 17; Rose, supra note 16; Amanda M. Rose,
Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (2011).
19. Rose, supra note 16, at 1255.
20. Id. at 1256.
21. For example, shareholders can “vote directors out of office, sue them for breach of
fiduciary duty, or (most promising) take the so-called Wall Street Walk.” Id.
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otherwise go undetected, Rule 10b-5 class actions may in fact produce
valuable deterrence benefits. After all, when fraud is exposed,
shareholders take notice and punishment swiftly follows. Individuals
are fired, others suffer reputational damage, and a share sell-off is
typically triggered, leading to a large drop in the firm’s stock price
(which in turn impacts incentive compensation and increases the
company’s vulnerability to a takeover). The threat of such punishment
may, in turn, improve directors’ and officers’ ex ante incentives to
invest in fraud deterrence. To the extent fraud-on-the-market class
actions increase the likelihood of fraud detection, they should also
help to deter would-be fraudsters in a more direct fashion. As I have
previously argued, “[e]ven though [fraud-on-the-market] suits do not
result in the imposition of monetary sanctions on culpable officers, to
the extent they help detect frauds, they increase the likelihood that
culpable officers will be sanctioned by both the government (perhaps
22
even criminally) and by the firm itself.”
Importantly, it is the market-based, firm-based, and regulatory
punishment that follows from the exposure of fraud that really does
the deterrence work—not the monetary settlements that are
ultimately paid in fraud-on-the-market class actions, which are
23
basically just circular transfer payments. But the settlement payment
is necessary because it creates the pool of funds from which the
attorneys may be rewarded for their fraud detection efforts.
To be sure, this theory of the social purpose of fraud-on-themarket class actions raises some very important questions—namely,
how well do class action attorneys actually do at exposing frauds, and
are the costs associated with fraud-on-the-market class actions worth
the informational benefits they produce? Before turning to these
questions, however, let us first reconsider Halliburton’s impact on
Rule 10b-5 class actions in light of their informational function.

22. Id. at 1257.
23. To be sure, if settlement payments are not covered by insurance,
they, too, may impart punishment on the board through their impact on the value of
directors’ shareholdings. But studies show that the bulk of the decline in a firm’s stock
price upon the revelation of fraud is attributable to reputational loss rather than
anticipated legal penalties. Thus, the deterrence value of [fraud-on-the-market] suits
lies more in the information they produce about the underlying fraud than in the legal
remedies they impose.
Id. at 1256–57.
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III. THE FORM-DRIVEN INEFFICIENCIES OF FRAUD-ON-THEMARKET SUITS
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to reverse the course it took a quarter century
ago by overruling Basic v. Levinson. It chose allegiance to the
doctrine of stare decisis, reaffirming the Basic presumption of reliance
while also making clear that defendants should have an opportunity
to rebut it at the class certification stage by presenting evidence that
24
the alleged misrepresentation did not actually impact the stock price.
The decision creates a host of new issues for lawyers to battle
over. For example, what is the level of proof required to rebut the
25
Basic presumption through evidence of lack of price impact? And
26
what procedurally would the effect of such a rebuttal be? How
should courts react when the evidence presented to rebut the
presumption is relevant both to price impact and to the issue of
materiality (which the Supreme Court held just two years before
27
Halliburton may not be litigated at class certification )? Should
courts demand less from plaintiffs seeking to establish the Basic
prerequisite of market efficiency, in light of statements in Halliburton
that markets can be “generally efficient” while at the same time
28
inefficiently processing certain types of information?
These questions will take much time and consume significant
resources to resolve. And yet they are wholly unrelated to what
actually matters in fraud-on-the-market litigation, once its true
information-producing function is recognized. Shareholders and
regulators are eager to learn whether corporate agents intentionally
lied to the marketplace, so that they may dole out punishment as
necessary. They do not care whether the prerequisites to class
certification have been satisfied or if reliance or loss causation can
been established. Yet these are the issues that consume a great deal of
the judicial docket in fraud-on-the-market class actions.
24. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
25. See, e.g., Merrit B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on What Defendants Need to
Show to Establish No Impact on Price, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488055.
26. See, e.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, Answering Halliburton II’s Unanswered Question:
Burdens of Production and Persuasion on Price Impact at Class Certification, SEC. REG. L.J.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2540348.
27. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
28. See Mark I. Gross, Class Certification in a Post-Halliburton World, LAW360 (July 21,
2014,
10:47
AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/558536/class-certification-in-a-posthalliburton-ii-world.
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The disconnect between the legal form and practical function of
fraud-on-the-market class actions thus leads to considerable
inefficiency, raising the question whether they ought to be replaced
with an alternative information-production mechanism better suited
to the task.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Whether, on the whole, the informational benefits produced by
fraud-on-the-market class actions outweigh their costs is a difficult
empirical question to answer. But at least two things can be stated
with confidence. First, a significant percentage of fraud-on-the-market
class actions produce no informational benefits because they come
only after other sources have publicly exposed the fraud and do not
29
otherwise enrich the public’s understanding of what occurred. These
“follow-on” suits represent a pure deadweight cost to society. Second,
even the small percentage of fraud-on-the-market class actions that
do reveal new and valuable information produce deadweight social
costs to the extent the litigation focuses on the sort of irrelevant side30
issues discussed above. In light of this, it is worth considering
whether a better mechanism for fraud detection might be devised.
A full consideration of this issue would take us far beyond the
scope of this symposium contribution. But let me conclude by briefly
suggesting one possibility. As mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the SEC created the
31
Whistleblower Bounty Program in 2011. This program requires the
SEC to pay significant financial rewards to eligible individuals who
voluntarily provide the agency with original information about
securities law violations if that information leads to an enforcement
32
action resulting in $1 million or more in sanctions. It is thus designed
to provide financial incentives for individuals with knowledge of
securities law violations to come forward to report it to the SEC. The
program further seeks to encourage reporting by promising

29. According to one academic study, private litigation uncovered only 3% of the
incidents of financial fraud exposed between 1996 and 2004 in companies with more than $750
million in assets. See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J.
FIN. 2213, 2230 (2010).
30. See supra Part III.
31. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.A. (West 2015)).
32. For an in depth description of the program’s requirements, see Rose, supra note 16 at
1260–1272.
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whistleblowers confidential treatment and providing them with a
33
cause of action for employer retaliation.
In Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower
34
Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, I argue
that the program is much better designed to elicit new information
about corporate fraud than fraud-on-the-market class actions, and
might serve as a template for the latter’s replacement. For example,
unlike fraud-on-the-market class actions, the bounty program targets
its rewards at individuals who actually produce new information
about managerial malfeasance, and award determinations require
consideration of none of the irrelevant issues commonly fought about
in fraud-on-the-market suits. I further argue that the program is likely
to reduce the informational benefits produced by fraud-on-themarket class actions, whatever they may have been in the past. This is
easy to see once one considers how class action attorneys—who are
really outsiders to corporations with no special informational
advantages—likely go about trying to detect frauds.
There are two main possibilities. First, it may be that class action
attorneys are effective at getting corporate insiders with knowledge to
35
reveal information to them. But in the wake of the bounty program,
those same insiders now have much more powerful incentives to
report to the SEC. They have the promise of a large bounty payment,
and also enjoy confidential treatment and legal protection against
employer retaliation—benefits that do not flow from helping a class
action lawyer. So the informants to class action attorneys of yesterday
are very likely to become the SEC tipsters of today.
Second, it is possible that class action attorneys have developed
some expertise in examining and analyzing publicly available
information to discover suspicious disclosure practices. But the
bounty program rewards people who can do this, too—company
outsiders who see things in publicly available information that others
do not. This type of knowledge fits within the program’s definition of

33. See id.
34. Id.
35. The heightened pleading requirements and discovery stay imposed on plaintiffs by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has led to heavy reliance by plaintiffs’ lawyers on
confidential informants. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J.
CORP. L. 551, 554 (2011) (“Allegations based on [information provided by confidential
informants] often are the only specific allegations in a complaint supporting a claim of securities
fraud.”).
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36

“original information.” So class action attorneys can recover
personally through the program, as can other market participants, if
they share this sort of special fraud-detection capability. Again this
means there will be less of this sort of fraud left for fraud-on-themarket class action attorneys to expose.
The one potential downside of the program is that, to function
well, it requires that the SEC follow through on the tips it receives,
and pay out bounties in a way that will encourage tips going forward.
So far, the SEC’s administration of the program has been
encouraging. Tips continue to pour in (over 3,600 in the 2014 fiscal
year), and the SEC has handed out some impressive bounty awards
37
(including a $30 million and $14 million award). But one might
worry that this will change, and in the future ineffective
administration of the program will operate to undermine its
informational benefits. This concern does not, however, counsel in
favor of retaining fraud-on-the-market suits. Rather, as detailed in
Better Bounty Hunting, adding a qui tam provision to a dysfunctional
bounty program would be a superior alternative to retaining fraud38
on-the-market suits. Such a provision would allow qualifying
whistleblowers to bring suit on behalf of the government when the
SEC fails to investigate a tip, and thus would maintain a private check
on agency under-enforcement, but without the considerable
inefficiencies associated with fraud-on-the-market suits.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance in Basic v. Levinson, it created something
quite distinct from the common law fraud cause of action that private
Rule 10b-5 litigation had originally been modeled on. Indeed, fraudon-the-market class actions brought under Rule 10b-5 share none of
the social virtues of common law fraud cases. If they are to be
defended, it is because they help bring information about the
wrongdoing of corporate agents to the attention of shareholders and
regulators. But this information-production function is compromised
by the outdated form of fraud-on-the-market class actions, a form that

36. See Rose, supra note 16, at 1262.
37. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODDFRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annualreport-2014.pdf.
38. See Rose, supra note 16, at 1290–1300.
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rewards lawyers regardless of whether their cases bring new
information to light and which requires expensive litigation over
pointless issues. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. renders this situation worse, making
more urgent the need to look for superior alternatives. One such
alternative already exists—the SEC’s new Whistleblower Bounty
Program. Unlike fraud-on-the-market class actions, the bounty
program rewards only those individuals who actually bring forth new
information about securities law violations, and requires resolution of
none of the irrelevant issues that clog the judicial docket in fraud-onthe-market cases. It thus has the distinct advantage of reconciling
legal form with social function.

